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Compare zero trust deployment models

Compare device agent and gateway, enclave gateway, resource portal, and application sandbox deployment boundaries.

Learning outcomes

  • Place clients, gateways, portals, enclaves, and application sandboxes in the request path.
  • Compare protocol coverage, client requirements, bypass, identity, and failure behavior.
  • Select a model for a named resource rather than for the whole network by default.
  • Combine models without creating parallel implicit-trust paths.

System and boundaries

In a device agent and gateway model, endpoint software steers traffic to a gateway. In an enclave gateway model, gateways protect communication between defined network or service enclaves. In a resource portal model, a client reaches resources through a browser or application portal without a general endpoint tunnel. Application sandboxing isolates selected application traffic and state on the device. These are placement patterns, not complete policy models.

Request and decision flow

For each model, trace client selection, endpoint identity, traffic steering, gateway or portal, policy decision, protected resource, application authorization, evidence, and recovery. State which protocols and applications the path supports and whether the client can reach the resource another way.

Failure domains

Device agents can be disabled or compromised. Enclave gateways can preserve broad trust inside the enclave. Portals can cover only compatible application traffic and can become credential or content intermediaries. Sandboxes can share host, browser, network, or identity state. Mixed models can create an unreviewed fallback path.

Design tradeoffs and residual risk

Endpoint clients cover more protocols and increase deployment and device trust. Clientless portals reduce endpoint work and limit protocol and application compatibility. Enclave gateways ease migration and retain internal implicit trust. Sandboxing improves separation and adds platform dependence.

Residual risk includes direct origins, unmanaged devices, unsupported protocols, compromised clients, broad enclave access, portal application defects, and incomplete evidence across models.

Pomerium boundary

Pomerium provides clientless HTTP access and documented client or native patterns for selected non-HTTP protocols. It can serve as a resource-facing gateway or portal component. Operators choose topology, client coverage, upstream isolation, endpoint controls, network boundaries, and application authorization.

Exercise

Apply all four models to one administration service with browser, API, and SSH access. For each, draw client, enforcement, identity, protocol, direct path, failure, evidence, and recovery. Select the smallest model set that covers the required paths.

Evaluation checklist

  • Which named resources and protocols does each model cover?
  • Where are client, gateway, portal, enclave, and application trust boundaries?
  • Can the client or another workload bypass the selected path?
  • What happens when the agent, gateway, portal, or sandbox fails?
  • Does combining models preserve one explicit policy and evidence chain?

Next learning unit

Zero Trust

Zero trust does not assume that every user or device is malicious.

Sources and further reading

Keep learning

Application and Service AccessZero Trust

Named Resource Access

Grant access to one named application or service without extending general reachability to its network or neighboring systems.

Learn this term
Application and Service AccessNetwork and Infrastructure

Clientless Zero Trust Access

Distinguish browser or native-client access from broad network tunnels and state which protocols still require a local connector.

Learn this term

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