Malicious code and behavior
Malware is code intentionally used to compromise confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, or control. It can steal credentials and data, persist, execute commands, spy, spread, encrypt or destroy data, disable controls, and provide remote access. Names such as trojan, worm, ransomware, spyware, and rootkit describe delivery or behavior, not complete response.
Entry and authority
Map phishing, exploit, drive-by download, package, update, document, script, removable media, remote service, credential use, and insider installation. The malware acts with the permissions and trust available to its process, user, workload, device, kernel, or management system.
Reduce executable entry, patch exposed systems, verify software provenance, use application control and memory-safe design, isolate workloads, restrict egress and credentials, and protect administrative tools.
Detection and containment
Use endpoint, process, file, network, identity, cloud, and application evidence. Look for behavior and persistence, not only file hashes. Isolate affected systems, revoke credentials and sessions, block command paths, protect clean backups, preserve evidence, and scope related identities and hosts.
Containment must account for attacker control beyond the original file, including new accounts, tokens, cloud keys, policy changes, and modified build systems.
Failure and residual risk
Malware can use valid tools and memory-only execution. Signatures miss new variants. Removing one file does not remove persistence or stolen credentials. Reimaging one host does not repair a compromised identity provider or deployment pipeline. Aggressive isolation can disrupt critical service.
A clean scanner result does not prove a host trustworthy. Recovery needs known-good artifacts and negative tests.
Pomerium boundary
Pomerium can restrict and log access through protected routes, which can limit one credential or lateral path. It does not inspect endpoints for malware or secure direct paths, local processes, build systems, or application code. Compromised endpoints can use valid sessions until containment revokes and invalidates them.
Evaluation checklist
- Which code, document, package, update, credential, remote service, or insider path can introduce malicious behavior?
- What user, workload, kernel, cloud, build, and network authority does the code inherit or steal?
- Which behavior and persistence evidence remains useful after hashes and infrastructure change?
- Does containment revoke identities, sessions, keys, policy changes, and downstream access with host isolation?
- Can recovery prove known-good artifacts, clean control planes, restored evidence, and failure of old authority?
