Secure Platforms and Trusted Components
Build justified trust from small enforcement components, hardened runtimes, boot evidence, isolation, and controlled information flow.
Topic index
Learn how trusted bases, isolation, boot integrity, attestation, information flow, and shared hardware shape system security.
Topic index
Pomerium can protect administrative and application routes and can use identity and device evidence in access policy. Operators still own the hosts, kernels, hypervisors, firmware, boot chain, runtime isolation, platform attestation, and information-flow controls below and around those routes.
1 learning path
Build justified trust from small enforcement components, hardened runtimes, boot evidence, isolation, and controlled information flow.
5 related guides
Model secret-dependent signals and deliberate covert channels across software, shared hardware, protocols, and physical devices.
Define labels, allowed flows, trusted transformations, release policy, evidence, and residual channels across an application and its data systems.
Connect roots of trust, boot verification, measurements, fresh evidence, appraisal, policy, update, revocation, and recovery.
Build, deploy, verify, update, and recover a role-specific minimal service without broad host or control-plane authority.
Derive the real trusted set for one security claim, remove accidental trust, and build evidence for every remaining assumption.
15 related terms
Find unintended communication paths that let cooperating subjects transfer information through shared storage, timing, load, errors, or resource state.
Bound untrusted code with explicit memory, process, file, network, device, syscall, identity, and resource controls.
Model physical and logical faults that skip checks, corrupt state, expose keys, or force unsafe recovery in a security component.
Use precise models, invariants, and proofs to answer a bounded security question without confusing the model with the deployed system.
Anchor a narrow security function in protected hardware while stating the manufacturing, firmware, key, lifecycle, and physical assumptions that remain.
Derive protected facts from permitted queries, aggregates, models, correlations, errors, and repeated observations.
Control where information may move after access by tracking source, destination, transformation, label, release, and declassification.
Enforce mandatory policy when one system processes information and users at different sensitivity and clearance levels.
Appraise fresh signed evidence about a platform through explicit attester, verifier, reference-value, policy, and relying-party roles.
Split a service into components with different authority so compromise of one parser or workflow does not grant the complete service privilege.
Distinguish code authorization before execution from recorded boot measurements used for later appraisal and recovery.
Understand the small privileged mechanism that implements a reference monitor and controls access to system resources.
Analyze information leaked through time, caches, memory access, power, emissions, sound, faults, resources, and error behavior.
Reduce a deployed system to required services, identities, interfaces, privileges, configurations, and recovery paths, then keep it there.
Identify every component whose correct behavior is necessary for a stated security property, then reduce and verify that trusted set.